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Executive Summary 
The Constitution Unit is carrying out a study of Scottish Independence, funded by a grant 
from the Esm6e Fairbairn Charitable Trust: how Scotland might gain independence, and the 
consequences for Scotland and the rest of the UK if she did. As part of this study we have 
examined the place of an independent Scotland in Europe. Would Scotland remain a 
member of the EU? 
1. The SNP claims that an independent Scotland would automatically succeed to the United 
Kingdom's treaty rights and obligations, including membership of the European Union. 
However, there is no automatic right to membership of the European Union. Continued 
membership would only be possible with the approval of all Member States. 
2. Realistically, Scotland can. expect negotiations for EU membership to begin before 
independence is gained. There would probably be a continuation of the imposition of 
Community law on an agreed basis until negotiations are completed and all sides ratify 
the agreement. 
3. Should all negotiations fail, existing Community regulations and directives would 
continue to apply as they are part of Scots law. However, Scotland would be under no 
legal obligation to adopt any future EC legislation or follow any decisions of the ECJ. 
Moreover, the provisions of the Treaty on ~ u r o ~ e a n  U ion would cease to be binding on 
Scotland and its citizens. 
4. If Scotland were to apply to become a member timing would matter because the EU is in 
a process of enlargement and the terms that an independent Scotland could negotiate 
would differ if the EU had 21 or 28 rather than the current 15 Member States. 
5. An independent Scotland which remained in the EU would continue to be eligible for 
grants from the Structural Funds. But EU enlargement changes the map of 
disadvantaged regions, boosting the position of Scotland relative to new EU averages 
and making it harder for Scotland to qualify for additional funds. 
6. Enlargement also has an impact on the status of small states in the EU. Whereas an 
independent Scotland would have the right to nominate a Commissioner now, it may 
lose that right once the EU increases in size. Moreover, physical representation in the EU 
does not guarantee effective representation. Where would an independent Scotland find 
voting partners if their policy line does not receive the backing of the UK Government? 
Introduction 
The SNP's slogans "Scotland in Europe" and "Independence in Europe" are both catchy 
and complex. They are catchy and evocative for a multiplicity of reasons. On the one hand 
they act as a persuasive panacea for all who doubt that a small nation like Scotland would 
be able to stand on its own two feet in the big world. On the other hand they articulate that 
Scotland is not a parochial region of nationalist bigots but an open-minded and 
cosmopolitan one that embraces European integration. 
But they are also complex statements in that they imply that an independent Scotland 
would have a natural right to be a player in the European Union. This, however, is assumed 
and not established. Moreover, the statements suggest that the alliance with Brussels is 
necessarily preferable to the alliance with Westminster and, indeed, wanted by those who 
advocate an independent Scotland. 
This briefing examines the issue of State succession to the EU Treaty. Since the EU Treaty 
itself does not lay down rules on succession: it is necessary to look at the rules governing 
succession to multilateral treaties in general and scrutinise individual examples of changes 
to the territorial application of the EU Treaty. The second part examines the effect an 
independent Scotland would have on the European Union. 
The force of European law in the United Kingdom is based on the European Communities 
Act 1972 which accorded domestic legal effect to the Treaty of Accession by which the 
United Kingdom joined the European Communities (the European Economic Community, 
the European Coal and Steel Community, and Euratom). Were Scotland to withdraw from 
the United Kingdom, the consequences of an independent Scottish State would need to be 
addressed on the European as well as on the domestic level. 
I The EU Treaty and Succession 
The SNP argues that Scotland would enjoy the same rights and be bound by the same 
obligations currently in force for the United Kingdom. Not only that but membership to 
international organisations (including the EU), they claim, is governed by the same rules of 
succession. In 1997 and 1999 the SNP released dossiers on the legal basis for independence 
which endorsed statements made in 1989 by a number of lawyers. They argue that Scotland 
would naturally remain within the European Union. The legal and political opinion cited in 
The Treaty on European Union (as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam) now provides for 
suspension of rights of membership if the Council, following the criteria and processes laid down in 
the dossiers comes out in support of smooth and rapid accession to the EU. French 
advocate Maitre Xavier de Roux summarises the argument in the following terms: 
"Scotland is part of the Common Market territory by virtue of the United 
Kingdom's accession to the Treaty of Rome and by application of the Treaty of 
Union 1707. If the Treaty of Union was revoked and if Scotland recovered its 
international sovereignty, it would be accepted within the Common Market 
without any formality".3 
As the EU Treaty includes Scotland within its remit and because EU law directly affects the 
Scots, Scotland is not a third party to the Treaty. On independence, it could not be regarded 
as a new applicant state (like Poland or Estonia) as the UK acted on behalf of Scotland when 
it joined the European Communities in 1973. According to de Roux's argument, a change in 
Scotland's political status would have no bearing on the legal status of Scotland in Europe. 
Professor Emile Noel, former Secretary General of the European Commission, and Lord 
Mackenzie-Stuart argued that Scottish independence would result in the creation of two 
Member States of equal status. The rump United Kingdom (rUK) would not be more 
powerful than Scotland. And without evidence to the contrary, Noel is certain that "the will 
of the people would be interpreted as a desire to retain the European status q ~ o " . ~  
Former Director General of the European Commission and former EC Ambassador to the 
United Nations Eamonn Gallagher sees "no sustainable legal or political objection to 
separate Scottish membership of the European Community". If Scotland is willing and able 
to meet the demands and requirements of CO 
mmunity membership, then the EU ought to be flexible enough to resolve any institutional 
matters arising in relation to, inter alia, weighted voting in the Council, the number of 
Members of the European Parliament (MEP), and number of Commissioners. 
With such heavyweight opinion to back up their claim, as well as various statements by 
European and foreign officials, Ministers, Ambassadors and politicians of Member States 
who cannot conceive of Scotland being excluded from membership, the sentiment that 
Scotland might not be admitted to the EU does seem "specious and [without] constitutional 
or legal credibilityw.' 
Articles 6 and 7, finds that human rights or other fundamental values of the EU have been flagrantly 
violated by a Member State 
"SNP Press Office, Independence in  Europe Dossier, 28 May 1999. 
"bid. 
Tlze Herald, 7 November 1998. 
1. Background of the Vienna Convention on State Sziccession in Respect of Treaties 
The SNP's claim to succession to EU Treaty rights and obligations stands or falls on the 
application of the Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties (henceforth 
the Con~ention).~ Their claim will be examined in greater detail below. A closer look at the 
Convention, however, is required beforehand. 
The Convention is concerned mainly with the position of the 'newly independent State', 
which Article 2(l)(f) defines as "a successor State the territory of which immediately before 
the date of the succession of States was a dependent territory for the international relations 
of which the predecessor State was responsible". The focus on colonies is not coincidental. 
The Convention is concerned with State creations in the post-colonial context which is 
important when thinking about its relevance for Scotland. 
Newly independent and other successor States are treated differently under the 
Convention. Controversially, the former are presumed to begin life unencumbered with a 
clean slate ('negative1 theory), whereas other successor States are presumed to continue 
automatically the treaty obligations of the predecessor State ('universal succession'). Article 
2(l)(b) of the Convention defines the succession of States as the "replacement of one State 
by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory". Does the SNP 
hope that Scotland would fall into the latter category and be the successor State in 
international law to the United Kingdom? would Scotland be resurrecting its age-old 
historic claim to statehood rather than establishing a brand new one? According to 
international practice, rUK rather than Scotland would be the successor State (or better: the 
continuing State). Continuity is presumed for the sake of legal certainty (Articles 34 and 35 
of the Convention). In practice there is a clear tendency to succeed to multilateral treaties 
and conventions of a legislative or universal nature. 
The Convention targets only the above two scenarios of State succession (neither of which 
applies to Scotland) and does not consider the various routes succession can take 
(continuation, separation, dissolution, merger, cession etc). Under the two available 
definitions Scotland would have to be squeezed into the category of a newly independent 
h Adopted 22 August 1978; see 17 ILM (1978) 1488,. or 
http: / /www.~~n.org/law /ilc/ texts/ treas~cchtm (visited 08 February 2001). The Convention has 
been ratified by more than the necessary fifteen states and entered into force on 6 November 1996 in 
accordance with Article 49(1). By the end of 1999 it had twenty signatories and seventeen parties, 
namely Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Iraq, 
Morocco, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia. Source: "Multilateral Treaties Deposited 
with the Secretary General: Status as at 31 December 1999" Vol. I1 at 277, (United Nations 
Publication). It can thus be seen that the Convention took a very long time to attract even fifteen 
ratifications (out of nearly 200 potential parties), and that the states which have ratified are to a 
State within the colonial context. What the framers of the Convention had in mind, 
however, were in the first instance colonial territories that were granted independence and 
could not be expected to continue the bilateral treaty obligations of their colonial ruler 
(Article 16 of the Convention).' Ideally there should have been included a third category of 
"'quasi-newly independent States' which would have included States emerging outside a 
colonial context but in circumstances resembling the emergence of a newly independent 
State" (Kamminga 1996: 471). Indeed, the International Law Commission had proposed 
such a category for cases like the partition of East and West Pakistan from India in 1947.8 
However, France and Switzerland objected to this category, apparently because they did 
not want to undermine the territorial integrity of their unitary State by inadvertently 
promoting separatist movements (ibid.). 
In sum, the situation the Convention envisages does not fit squarely with the situation 
Scotland's secession would create. 
2. Relevance to the EU Treaty 
Since the SNP believes that it nonetheless has an arguable case for establishing that the 
Convention would govern Scotland's succession to the EU's rights and obligations, their 
claim needs to be addressed in more detail. The case of separation of States is covered by 
the Convention, which emphasises continuity of treaty relations. In relation specifically to 
the EU Treaty, the SNP relies heavily on Article 34(1) of the Convention which provides: 
When a part or parts of a territory of a State separate to form one or more States, 
whether or not the predecessor State continues to exist: 
a) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of 
the entire territory of the predecessor State continues in force in respect of each 
successor State so formed; [. . .] 
On the face of it, Article 34(1) of the Convention would seem to support automatic 
continuation of the EU Treaty provisions in an independent Scotland, and it would apply 
regardless of whether the United Kingdom continued to exist. Relying only on this 
provision, French Advocate de Roux argues (for the SNP) that "the simple acceptance by 
the successor state [an independent Scotland] of the obligations contracted on its behalf by 
its predecessor [the United Kingdom] is equivalent to an accession by that successor ~ t a t e " .~  
disproportionate degree small states recently involved in questions of state succession. The United 
Kingdom has not ratified the Convention, nor has any other major state. 
' The principle of non-succession is also echoed in Articles 17 and 24 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties whereby a new state is under no obligation to succeed to a treaty. 
R Yearbook of the ILC (1974) 11, Part One, 260 - 266). 
'SNP Press Office, independence in  Europe Dossier, 28 May 1999. 
However, there are numerous and severe difficulties relating to the assumption that the EU 
Treaty will continue to apply by virtue of Article 34(1). 
First, the EU Treaty establishes its own legal regime and creates an international 
organisation that is fundamental to the substantive legal regime established. The general 
rules of succession in international law do not apply to this case. Rather, Article 4 of the 
same Convention governs treaties establishing international organisations to which the 
predecessor State was a party. It provides that: 
The present Convention applies to the effects of a succession of States in respect 
of: 
a) any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an international 
organization without prejudice to the rules concerning acquisition of membership 
and without prejudice to any other relevant rules of the organization; 
b) any treaty adopted within an international organization without prejudice to 
any relevant rules of the organization.. 
(emphasis added) 
The Convention in one of its very early provisions places paramount emphasis on the rules 
of accession and the rules of the international organisation in question. In other words, the 
Convention does not override the regime set up by the EU Treaty. 
Second, paragraph (1) of Article 34 of the Convention has to be read in conjunction with 
paragraph (2) of the same provision which states that the former paragraph does not apply 
if: 
b) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the 
application of the treaty in respect of the successor State would be incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the 
conditions for its operation. 
(emphasis added) 
The object and purpose of the EU Treaty can be found in the preamble as well as in Articles 
2 and 3 TEC. The creation of a new Scottish State would - if only formally - change the 
conditions for operation and application of the institutional and financial provisions of the 
EU Treaty. It would be adding a new Member State to the EU and this would require 
formal treaty changes according to the specific rules of EU accession rather than the general 
and vague rules of international law on succession to multilateral treaties. To illustrate, the 
EU Treaty is premised upon the existence of a particular number of Member States. Voting 
rights are weighted and numbers of representatives are allocated on the basis of the size of 
the State. Amendments to those provisions require negotiation of an amending treaty and 
its subsequent ratification by all the existing Member States and by the newly acceding 
State. 
Third, the rule enshrined in Article 34(1) is widely believed to be "too rigid and simplistic 
and [not to] correspond ... to international practice: therefore it cannot be considered a 
customary norm" (Mullerson 1993: 488). For instance, bilateral treaties and multilateral 
treaties with limited participation concluded by the Soviet Union passed over only to 
Russia. The other successor States had to discontinue their participation or renegotiate the 
treaty in question. Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Estonia Rein Mullerson goes on to 
argue that, as far as international practice is concerned, it is the proviso in Article 34(2) that 
best encapsulates the general rule that the tenor of the treaty in question is to be respected 
above all else. 
Fourth, the Convention is of only limited value to the present discussion. First and 
foremost, although it has been open for signatare since 1978 and in force since 1996, the 
United Kingdom is not a party to the Convention; nor is any other EU Member State. 
Whereas the Legal Advisor to the U.S. State Department expressed the view in 1980 that the 
rules of the Convention were "generally regarded as declarative of existing customary law 
by the United  state^"'^, a majority within the Committee of Legal Advisors for the Council 
of Europe agreed that the Convention did not so reflect customary law." But even if doubts 
regarding the Convention as a whole persist, there seems widespread consensus that "the 
formulation in Article 34 cannot be taken as reflective of customary law" (Shaw 1997: 690). 
There is, therefore, no general rule which would permit a seceding entity (like Scotland) to 
succeed to a treaty (like the EU Treaty) if such succession would upset the treaty regime. 
Fifth, the International Law Commission has also asserted that, where membership is on 
account of a formal process of admission (such as is the case with the EU) 
"a new State is not entitled automatically to become a party to the constituent 
treaty and a member of the organisation as a successor State simply by reason of 
"' 1980 Digest of United States Practice in International Law 1041 n.43 (quoting memorandum of 
Roberts Owen, U.S. State Department Legal Advisor. 
" Committee of Legal Advisors on Public Jnternational Law for the Council of Europe, 
Extraordinary Meeting (16 January 1992), at 3. 
the fact that at the date of the succession its territory was subject to the treaty 
and within the ambit of the organisation"." 
As with other international organisations, a new State can only become a member if the 
existing members agree to admit it. The EU Treaty would require alteration to make room 
for Scotland's representation and this in turn requires the consent of all Member States. 
There is no automatic right of entry and no precedent for such a proposition. As Happold 
concludes, "...the structure of the EU's constituent treaties themselves does not permit a 
State to succeed to membership of the Union" (2000: 31). Scotland cannot claim membership 
to the EU as of right. This conclusion is also supported by the practice of international 
organisations to which new States cannot succeed automatically but have to apply to join. 
The above analysis rebuts the SNP's claim that Article 34 (1) would govern automatic 
membership to the EU. 
II Application of EU Law in Scotland Post-Independence without 
Succession 
Even though EU law would not continue t o  apply by virtue of Article 34(1) of the 
Convention, that is not to say that Scottish membership of the EU would never be 
automatic. Much would depend on the overall political context, on the attitudes taken by 
the (rump) UK and on relations between the UK and the EU. The EU has at least three 
options: 
It could decide that a newly independent part of an existing Member State is 
automatically a member of the EU; 
The EU could give the new State expedited membership; or 
The EU could insist that the new State is to be treated like an applicant State and has to 
apply for admission. 
But importantly, in none of these three cases is it for Scotland to decide which possible 
route is chosen. The EU chooses whom it lets in and it does so rigorously: all membership 
applications require unanimity among the Member States negotiating accession, assent by 
the European Parliament, and ratification by all the national parliaments. It ought to be 
borne in mind that the UK would have a veto with respect to Scottish membership 
(although it is doubtful on what grounds it might be exercised), so it is imperative that the 
l2 (1974) Y.B.I.L.C., Vol.11, pt.1, at 177-8. 
internal negotiations are sorted out amicably and prior to an Intergovernmental Conference 
which recognises Scotland (either as a new or as a successor State). 
Realistically, Scotland can expect - more or less automatically - negotiations for EU 
membership to begin before independence is gained. In the event that the negotiations are 
not completed at the date of independence there would be a continuation of the imposition 
of the acquis communautaire on an agreed basis until negotiations are completed and all 
sides ratify the agreement. 
Scotland's options are two-fold and subject to external pressure. It can keep a low profile 
and go for smooth and rapid acceptance by the EU. By conforming to the UK's terms of 
membership and adopting the acquis in its entirety, Scotland would continue its place in 
Europe in a spirit of co-operation and continuation that is unlikely to raise objections from 
other Member States. 
Alternatively, Scotland could decide to make use of its newly gained independence and re- 
negotiate the terms of membership. It might, for instance, try and secure a better deal on 
fisheries than the UK did or demand more money for the Highlands and Islands out of the 
Structural Funds. Once Scotland starts cherry picking, adopting the legislation it likes and 
rejecting the legislation it does not, it will meet with resistance from and tough negotiations 
with other Members. The question then becomes how much time and resources the other 
Member States want to invest if Scotland enters negotiations in a spirit of confrontation and 
conflict. Scotland's strategy could easily backfire and it may end up having to relinquish 
access to fishing grounds, for instance, in order to 'buy off' some Member States. 
111 Worst Case Scenario 
The worst case scenario is that both law and politics fail Scotland's independence. On the 
legal plane, the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties is 
somewhat doubtful evidence of customary international law and Scotland does not have a 
right under the Treaty to succeed to the United Kingdom's EU rights and obligations. On 
the political plane, negotiations with the other Member States could run into difficulties and 
Scotland could then find itself outside the EU. But even then it still seems hard to accept 
that all the substantive law that has emanated from Brussels since 1958 and has applied in 
the United Kingdom since 1973 would cease to have effect overnight in Scotland at the date 
of its independence. There is an instinctive feeling that because of the long-standing object 
and purpose of the European Union, the profound impact of European law, and the 
evolving nature of the Union as a whole that integration - of the kind Scotland has 
mastered - cannot be revoked with the stroke of a pen. 
What would happen if Scotland became independent but did not - for whatever reason - 
negotiate with the EU? The position of Professor Neil MacCormick (SNP MEP) is that the 
application of the EU Treaty in Scotland would continue post-independence. In a letter to 
the Glasgow Herald (1 June 1999) he wrote: 
"The Greenland precedent is of decisive importance, for it shows that as a 
matter of European law a territory cannot sever itself unilaterally from the 
constitutional jurisdiction of the European Communities (or, now, European 
Union) simply by means of a change of the constitutional relationships within a 
member state." 
According to his analysis, the Denmark/Greenland negotiations demonstrate that a part of 
the EU can move outside or cease to be subject to EU law only through a negotiated 
settlement. It is thus plausible that the whole body of European law would continue to 
apply unless and until a decision is reached to end it. There would have to be a negotiated 
exit of Scotland, as with Greenland. 
MacCormick's conclusion, however, is itself contestable. That Greenland's exit from the EC 
had to be negotiated cannot be taken as evidence that an independent Scotland would 
remain in the EU unless it specifically negotiated an exit. In 1979 Greenland did not become 
independent of Denmark, and the referendum held in 1982 was simply a vote to leave the 
EC by a portion of a continuing State. The situation is analogous to a vote by Scotland to 
seek to leave the EU whilst remaining part of the UK. Furthermore, the negotiations were 
not simply about Greenland leaving but about the terms on which it could transfer to 
oversees countries and territories (OCT) status. 
In fact, if Scotland failed to negotiate, the status of Community law would be ambivalent. 
That ambivalence is best borne out by the following, extremely unlikely, scenario. Say 
Scotland issued a unilateral declaration of independence and then relied totally on 
automatic membership and did not engage in any negotiations with the European Union. 
Even then Community law would continue to apply, as it is part of Scots law by virtue of 
the European Communities Act 1972 as amended. So EC Regulations and domestic laws 
applying EC Directives on fishing or the environment would remain law until an 
independent Scotland changed them - which it could do if it wanted. 
However, Scotland would be under no legal obligation to adopt any pending or future EC 
legislation or follow any decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).13 Moreover, the 
whole Treaty insofar as it gives rights, gives them to Member States and their nationals. So 
Scottish individuals could not claim Treaty rights (e.g. to free movement or non- 
discrimination) because Scots would no longer be treated as EU nationals would as they 
would no longer be "UK nationals".14 The Treaty provisions would not apply unless 
Scotland became a member. Scotland could also not be taken to the ECJ under Article 228; 
ex Article 171 EC), bring an action under Article 232 TEC (ex Article 175 EC) or seek its 
guidance under Article 234 TEC (ex Article 177 EC). 
IV The Political Knock-On Effects 
The above scenario is unrealistic but it illustrates the crucial link between membership and 
the application of EU law. In a real-life case, continued membership in the EU depends as 
much on political negotiations as on European law. Politics may or may not work in 
Scotland's favour. Where there is political will within the EU there is without doubt a way 
in for Scotland. Without such a will, however, Scotland may find itself staring in the face of 
politics. Accession to the EU requires unanimity. Germany, France, Italy and Spain are the 
big boys of Europe and are anxious to avoid splintering their states. Some commentators 
cannot imagine that they would watch Scottish independence without any form of 
resistance. According to Professor Clive Archer from the University Association for 
Contemporary European Studies, such idleness would "defy both logic and politics". The 
implication is that Catalonia, Lombardy, Corsica, Brittany, Flemish Belgium, and even 
Bavaria would be casting a keen eye on Scotland, acutely observing the follow-on 
improvements and drawbacks that are significant not least for their own regions. This was 
the position held by Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary, in the past. In November 1998 he 
suggested that EU Member States, many of whom have secessionist movements of their 
own which their central governments are not keen to encourage, would veto Scottish 
membership.15 
Others, however, do not share these worries. Secessions and the break-up of states happen 
all over the world. Would the mere fact that Scottish secession took place in the context of 
the EU set a dangerous precedent for other Member States? Would the same not be true for 
all other separatist movements the world over? Arguably, so long as Scottish independence 
is the expression of the democratic will of the people and provided the UK resolves the 
matter in a democratic and civilised manner, no Member State would have the right or 
interest to block Scottish membership. It is an internal affair of the UK. Robin Cook's 
current position has become more closely aligned with this view. In July 2000 he said: 
"Europe is not going to throw Scotland out. It's in the nature of the European Union, it 
'"he Scottish Government may, as a matter of politics, choose to adopt such legislation and follow 
such rulings, as do a number of Eastern European candidate states. 
14 This term is defined by a unilateral declaration by the United Kingdom which was last amended in 
1981 to take account of the British Nationalities Act 1981. The rUK would no doubt ensure that it 
was amended to take account of Scotland's independence. 
'""EU rebuffs Cook claim in attack on SNP", The Guavdia~z 21 November 1998. 
welcomes all-corners and Scotland would be a member". He added, however, that 
membership itself was not the issue. "The issue is what is the price at which Scotland 
becomes a member of the European Union" and renegotiation would not work in Scotland's 
favour.16 (Renegotiation of Scottish membership is discussed below). 
Is Scottish independence a political movement that nation-states would want to stop in its 
tracks? Would it be difficult for the British Prime Minister to rally round his counterparts in 
Germany, France, Italy and Spain and block entry of Scotland to the EU? On what grounds 
would Scotland's entry be blocked? As Dr. Robert Lane from the University of Edinburgh 
concludes 
"Independence in Europe for Scotland (and for England) can be brought about 
only if action at the national level proceeds concurrently with action at the 
Community level, thus producing, at the end of the day, an agreed result which 
necessarily includes the concurrence of the Community institutions and all 
member states. A Scotland bent upon independence grounded in the clear 
democratic support of the Scottish people would create a moral and, given the 
international law principle of self-determination, probably a legal obligation for 
all member states to negotiate in good faith in order to produce such a result, 
but this solution lies essentially within the domain of politics, not law" (1991: 154-5; 
emphasis added). 
In the interaction of law and politics, the law is, however, a serious constraint and whoever 
leads Scotland into independence would be wise to move within the parameters of the legal 
framework. 
V Scotland and EEAJEFTA 
The SNP's 'Scotland in Europe' mantra was identified early on as complex. It creates a 
dilemma for certain voters, namely those who favour independence but outside the EU. It 
would be wrong to assume that the Scots are generally more EU-friendly than the English 
or Welsh. They may conclude, for example, that the EU does not offer their fishermen the 
best deal and that Scotland should not seek to be a Member State. 
Scotland as a whole may find that its fortunes lie outside the EU and that it is better off 
within the European Economic Area (EEA). The EEA widens the net of the EU's 'Single 
Market to cover three of four European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries: Norway, 
Iceland and Liechtenstein. Switzerland is a member of EFTA but voted against EEA 
membership in 1992. The analogies with 1celand and Norway are close - one is a fish 
producing country and the other a fish and oil producing country like Scotland. 
'' http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/scotland/newsid~845000/845039.stm [visited 08 February 
20011. 
14 
The EEA brings together the 15 EU Member States with the three EFTA EEA States. 
Together they form a huge single market that is g0verned.b~ a common set of rules, which 
the EFTA EEA countries are - at least in theory - able to influence. 
The benefits for Scotland would be real. It would have access to the Single Market on a 
reciprocal basis. The four freedoms (of goods, services, capital and persons) are guaranteed 
within the EEA. That means that, subject to a few exceptions in certain areas, the citizens of 
18 States have the right to move freely throughout the EEA in order to live, work, set up 
business, invest or buy real estate. Crucially, the EEA Agreement does not cover the EU's 
Common Agricultural Policy or the Common Fisheries Policy. It is limited to certain 
provisions governing various aspects of trade in agricultural and fish products. 
EEA membership would also make life 'easier' for the other EU Member States. The 
institutional consequences an independent Scotland would have on the EU Treaty (votes in 
the Council, a Commissioner, a judge, MEP's etc) need no longer be accommodated. It is 
easier to imagine EEA membership being accorded without the other EEA Members taking 
advantage of Scotland and demanding something in return. 
The SNP does not advocate such a policy. But it is a real alternative should membership in 
the EU not be possible or desirable. 
Practical d i f i cu l f  ies 
That said, there are a number of difficulties with the EEA. The EU reserves the right to 
discontinue the whole EEA agreement if any EEA member fails to adopt and implement all 
Community legislation. That places an onerous obligation on the EEA States when they do 
not take part in the elaboration and adoption of Community legislation. It is a common 
complaint, especially from Iceland, that EEA countries have none of the rights but all of the 
obligations. 
Moreover, the EEA grants access only to the Internal Market. But the most important 
Community developments are currently taking place outside the Internal Market. Economic 
and Monetary Union, enlargement, asylum, justice and foreign affairs, common foreign and 
security policy are areas that do not bear on EEA countries at all. 
The final question is whether the EEA would at all be open for new members. One could 
certainly not count on any goodwill from the EU to re-invigorate the EEA. There would be a 
great reluctance to open it up for new membership. 
For these reasons Scotland's future lies either within the EU or outside it. 
Conclusions: 
a The Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect of Treaties was drawn up against 
a colonial background and lays down the rules relating to newly independent States 
(which are given a clean slate) and other successor States (which are presumed to 
succeed automatically to the treaty heritage of their predecessors), which do not 
accurately reflect customary law and have not proved generally acceptable. 
There is no automatic right to membership of the European Union. State succession to 
treaties has to be governed by the nature of the treaty. Continued cover by the EU Treaty 
of the Scottish territory would thus only be possible with the approval of all Member 
States. 
Realistically, Scotland can expect - more or less automatically - negotiations for EU 
membership to begin before independence is gained. In the event that the negotiations 
are not completed at the date of independence there would probably be a continuation of 
the imposition of the acquis on an agreed basis until negotiations are completed and all 
sides ratify the agreement. 
Should all negotiations fail, Community regulations and directives would continue to 
apply in Scotland as they are part of Scots law by virtue of the European Communities 
Act 1972 as amended. Scottish nationals and companies would, however, lose EU rights 
elsewhere in Europe (including rUK). 
However, Scotland would be under no legal obligation to adopt any future EC legislation 
or follow any decisions of the ECJ. Moreover, the provisions of the EU Treaty would 
cease to be binding on Scotland and its citizens. 
Accession to the European Union 
In the case where Scotland secedes from the United Kingdom and finds itself outside the 
European Union, whilst rUK continues in the footsteps of the United Kingdom, the Scottish 
Government would have to decide whether or not to apply for EU membership. If Scotland 
desires to be a Member State then, alongside negotiations with the UK Government, the 
Scottish negotiating team would have to consider an independent Scotland's relationship 
with the EU. These negotiations would have to be handled in tandem. The events of 
German reunification and Greenland's. withdrawal from the EC illustrate that such major 
issues arising today have to be "treated as a Community issue rather than in terms of 
traditional nation-state perspectives" (Spence 1991: 47). 
I Requirements 
The current applicant states are expected by the EU to satisfy the so-called 'Copenhagen 
criteria' for EU membership, which stipulate the following. 
"Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and, protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy 
as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on 
the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, 
economic and monetary union."l7 
These criteria go beyond the formal requirements in the Treaty on European Union as 
amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which are limited to being a "European State" 
(Article 49 TEU) that respects those fundamental values enumerated in Article 6 TEU 
(liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of 
law). The Copenhagen criteria are, however, largely declaratory of the political values 
which have been applied to other candidate states in the past. These criteria will be 
dissected and addressed in turn. 
1. Political criteria 
Article 6 TEU (ex Article F EU) designates that "The Union is founded on the principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rules of 
law". Meeting these criteria will not be an issue for Scotland. In its strategy paper on 
17 European Council in Copenhagen, 21-23 June 1993, Co~zcIusions of the Presidency, SN 180/93. 
enlargement, the Commission looked at public administration, the judiciary, corruption, 
childcare institutions, gender equality and minority protection.18 
2. Economic criteria 
The two fundamental economic criteria are (1) the existence of a functioning market 
economy and (2) the capacity to withstand competitive pressure and market forces within 
the Union. The Commission Communication on Agenda 2000 elaborated on these criteria. 
The existence of a functioning market economy presupposes the liberalisation of prices and 
trade as well as the existence of an enforceable legal system and property rights. The 
emphasis is on performance of the economy (through macroeconomic stability and 
consensus about economic policy) and efficiency of the economy (through a strong financial 
sector and the absence of barriers to trade). In EU terms the efficient running of a market 
economy is required so that common policies such as the Single Market and the four 
freedoms of goods, persons, capital and services can be implemented smoothly and given 
full effect. 
The capacity to withstand competitive pressure and market forces within the Union 
requires a stable market economy as well as a propensity to permit economic agents to 
make decisions in "a climate of predictability". Nationalised industries must be privatised 
and investment is seen as the key to improved efficiency. 
3. Other obligations of membership 
a) The acquis communautaire 
The final point in the Copenhagen criteria is that membership requires "the candidate's 
ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, 
economic and monetary union." 
Accordingly, Scotland would have to adopt, implement and enforce the 'acquis 
communautaire' (to the extent that it has not already done so), by which is meant the 
comrnonality of rights and obligations that bind the Member States together. This body 
includes not just the successive treaties but also all secondary legislation (such as 
regulations and directives, as well as the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice) 
that stems from the European Union. 
18 EU Commission Strategy Paper: Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress towards 
Accession by each of the candidate countries, 8 November 2000, at 14. 
There is no principled reason why Scotland should not be able to meet the acquis. Rather, 
the hurdles it needs to surmount are practical. Many of the physical structures like central 
banks, tax collection structures and securities regulators have yet to be set up and 
implemented. The same can be said for customs, free movement of capital and other 
 institution^.'^ But such difficulties are neither new nor insoluble. According to the European 
Commission Representation in Scotland, the system that had been in place to communicate 
the adoption of national legislation emanating from EU legislation has already had to adapt 
to the requirements of devolution. Under Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act, the Scottish 
Executive may select its own implementation methods for EU Directives covering a 
devolved matter. Linkage mechanisms are certainly in place in Scotland but they would 
take a considerable amount of money and time to improve were Scotland to become 
independent, thus adding to the transition costs. 
Moreover, respecting and recognising the acquis takes place not just at the level of 
government and administration but also at the level of businesses, regional and local 
bodies, and professional organisations. The European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee, and the Committee of the Regions wish for deeper involvement of civic society 
in the acquis. Scotland's authorities would need to improve communication with the 
Scottish parliament to clarify the acquis and to foster nationwide adoption and 
implementation. 
b) EMU and the Euro 
Adopting Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the convergence criteria are a further 
part of the acquis which new Member States have to sign up to. However, achieving the 
convergence is not part of it. Since the UK has opted out of EMU the question is whether 
Scotland would inherit the benefit of the UK opt-out if it wanted to? This is not an offer 
made to current applicants. Member States would have to decide but would probably not 
allow Scotland to opt-out. Adopting the euro is very much seen as the crowning of what 
will have been a long process of economic integration in the EU. 
The process of adopting the euro is divided into three stages: 
the pre-accession phase: focus is on functioning market economy and macroeconomic 
stability; 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/reportllOO/index.htm (visited 08 February 
2001). 
19 For a list of the acquis chapter headings used in the screening of applicant states see: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/screen~en.htm [visited 08 
February 20011. 
the intermediary phase: the new member has acceded to the EU Treaty and participates 
fully in the Single Market whilst progressively integrating its monetary policy with the 
euro zone and participating in the exchange rate mechanism; 
and finally, participation in the euro zone. 
Conclusion 
There is nothing to suggest that Scotland would not be able to meet the criteria set out 
above. But meeting the accession criteria is not the be all and end all for applicant states. 
There will still be plenty to quarrel over, ranging from the number of votes in the Council to 
financial contributions and such like. There will in practice have to be a whole raft of 
negotiations with the Commission in the preparatory stage and the EU members in the 
negotiation of an accession treaty. The process of negotiation is discussed in "Application of 
EU Law" in the context of deciding whether continued membership in the EU would be 
prompt or problematic. The next section will continue examining the case where Scotland 
has to apply to join any applicant state. 
I I The Process 
Scotland cannot be compared to the other applicant countries currently queuing to be 
admitted to the EU. Crucially, the Scots have enjoyed EU rights and obligations for almost 
30 years. The following will provide an indication of the laboriousness of the process 
although it is extremely probable that most of this process will be side-stepped for Scotland 
unless Member States seriously want to make an awful example of Scotland for their own 
reasons. 
1. Negotiations 
The guidelines for the negotiations approved by the Luxembourg European Council (1997) 
and the Helsinki European Council (1999) provide that each applicant country proceeds at 
its own pace. The level of preparedness is a crucial factor. Applicants are assessed on their 
own merits and join the EU when they are found ready to meet the Copenhagen criteria. 
This is not anticipated to be problematic for Scotland. 
Negotiations are generally carried out in bilateral accession conferences (i.e. between the 
existing Member States and Scotland). With respect to the dozen or so applicant countries 
currently waiting to 'sail' into the EU under the 'regatta principle' or 'flotilla system' as 
adopted by the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999,*' the acquis was divided 
into 31 chapters. At the date of the EU's enlargement report in 8 November 2000 
negotiations with the six first countries had taken place in all but two chapters (on 
'institutional questions' and 'other questions') and 11 to 16 chapters had been provisionally 
closed, meaning that credible commitments as regards the harmonisation of laws plus 
administrative enforcement had been given. The Commission monitors those commitments. 
2. Changes for the EU 
Assuming that an independent Scotland can meet the Copenhagen criteria, it would then 
need formally to accede to the EU whilst the EU Treaty would have to be amended to cover 
Scotland. The process of accession is laid out in Article 49 TEU (ex Article 0 EU) and 
requires an application to the Council which, having consulted the Commission, must act 
unanimously. An absolute majority in the European Parliament must also agree to the new 
accession. 
But it is the second paragraph of Article 49 TEC that causes much difficulty and confusion. 
According to this sub-clause: 
"The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the treaties on which the 
Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an 
agreement between the Member-States and the applicant state. This shall be 
submitted for ratification by all the contracting states in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements." 
Different international organisations deal with accession and secession in different ways. 
Whereas the UN Charter, for instance, does not require amendment the European Treaty 
does. Some of the reasons for amendment are: 
to name the Member States of the Union; 
to define the territorial application of the Treaty; 
to stipulate the number of Members of the European Parliament (Article 190 TEC 
(ex Article 138 EC)); 
to state the number of weighted votes held by each Member State when the 
Council is required to act by a qualified majority (Art 205 TEC (ex Article 148 
W); 
to nominate a member of the Commission (Article 213 TEC (ex Article 157 EC)); 
20 Six countries (Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia) began 
negotiations on 31 March 1998 and are hoping to be admitted as soon as possible. Six other countries 
have been negotiating since 15 February 2000. Latvia, Malta and Slovakia are the strongest 
candidates, followed by Lithuania, whilst Bulgaria and Rumania are lagging behind. A thirteenth 
possibility is Turkey which has so far not taken up detailed negotiations. 
to nominate judges in the European Court of Justice (Article 221 TEC (ex Article 
165 EC)); 
to place a member in the Court of Auditors (Article 247 TEC (ex Article 188b EC)); 
to increase representation in the Economic and Social Committee (Article 258 TEC 
(ex Article 194 EC)); 
to increase representation in the Committee of the Regions (Article 263 TEC (ex 
Article 198a EC)). 
The SNP has called for Treaty amendment, among other reasons because of what they call 
the 'West Luxembourg' question. Whereas Luxembourg (with 360,000 inhabitants) 
currently has six members on the Committee of regions, Scotland has only four. Scotland 
has eight Members of the European Parliament (MEP) compared to Denmark's 16, although 
both have similar populations. According to calculation by the SNP, an amended Treaty 
after the Nice summit in December 2000 would give rise to the following changes: 
S N P  forecasts of Scottish representation within the EU 
Commission: Within the UK, Scotland has no right to nominate a 
Commissioner but would acquire that right as an independent Member 
State. 
Council of Ministers: Within the UK, Scotland has no guaranteed right to 
attend, lead or vote in national or European interest. As a Member State 
Scotland would have a guaranteed seat as well as speaking rights and 7 
votes (equal with Denmark, Finland and Ireland) which is roughly a quarter 
of the current UK total (29 votes). 
European Parliament: Within the UK, Scotland will lose seats down from 8 to 6 or 
7. As an independent Member State Scotland would have 13 MEP's (matching its 
comparator countries Denmark and Finland in terms of p~pulation).~' 
Other changes, according to the SNP, would be as follows: 22 
Scotland Now Scotland as Full Member 
of the European Union 
Economic and Social Committee Seats 2 9 
Committee of the Region Seats 4 9 
Able to take a turn as President of the Council? No Yes 
Able to nominate member of the European No Yes 
SNP Scottish Parliamentary Group, 11 December 2000. 
'' SNP Manifesto for the European Parliament Elections 1999. 
Court of Justice? 
Member of the Court of First Instance? No Yes 
Member of the European Court of Auditors? No Yes 
Member of the European Investment Bank? No Yes 
Member of the Committee of No Yes 
Representatives COREPER? 
Beneficiary of balance in the 28,000 No Yes 
civil service jobs among nationalities? 
Even if the SNP's predictions were correct the continued inclusion of Scotland in the 
European Union is more problematic than automatic. The above table lists the numerous 
necessary changes to be made to the EU Treaty in order to give full effect to Scottish 
membership. As discussed above, there can be no question of Scotland demanding that 
such changes be made as of right. They have to be negotiated and discussed at an 
Intergovernmental Conference. 
Furthermore, the SNP's predictions are (unsurprisingly) very generous. They assume, for 
instance, that Scotland would have a right to nominate a Commissioner. Whilst this would 
arguably be true if Scotland were independent now, it will not be true in the long run. The 
Nice summit agreed that as from 1 January 2005 the five big states give up their second 
commissioner in order to reduce the size of the Commission. Each Member State will have 
one Commissioner until the EU has 27 members, after which the Council will unanimously 
decide the size of the Commission. The Commission will then consist of fewer members 
than there are Member States and commissioners will be appointed by rotation among 
Member States on the basis of equality. As Scotland would be one of the small states, it 
would probably have to join the rotating system. The details have yet to be worked out but 
it cannot be taken for granted that Scotland will have the right to nominate a commissioner. 
Another instance where the SNP's calculations are optimistic is with their estimation that an 
independent Scotland would have more MEPs than it currently has. To be sure, the 
previous cap of 700 for the number of MEPs was set aside and increased to 732 at the Nice 
summit. But Scotland cannot necessarily rely on the figures for its comparator countries. 
The exact allocation of seats is not systematic but was an impromptu decision to 
compensate for the weighting of votes in the Council. The examples of the Czech Republic 
and Hungary illustrate that the present allocation of seats is contrary to the principle of 
equality, as the number of seats allocated to those countries is smaller than the number 
assigned to Member States with smaller populations. So enlargement means a reduction of 
MEPs per state to accommodate the newcomers. If Scotland became independent at a time 
when the EU has 21 Member States, it would force a further reduction of MEPs per state or 
an increase in the overall number of MEPs. 
Ill Effectiveness of Scottish Representation 
The SNP's slogan "Independence in Europe" once more brushes over the specific issues 
and the nuts and bolts of EU membership. From a dispassionate Scottish perspective the 
question is not so much whether Scotland could be an independent player in Europe (for 
there can be no doubt that it could) but whether independent Scottish representation in the 
EU would be more effective than its current representation via the United Kingdom. This 
section considers the SNP's drive for better representation and examines the way Scottish 
representation has been handled since the creation of the Scottish Parliament. Finally, it 
raises questions as to the efficiency of an independent Scotland's representation. 
Devolution has not led to any increase in attendance by Scottish ministers at meetings of the 
Council of Ministers in the European Union. Although they may attend all meetings that 
concern devolved matters (such as justice, transport, health, agriculture and fisheries), 
research done by the SNP in December 2000 showed that Scottish ministers had attended 
only eleven out of 120 Council sessions since the creation of the Scottish Parliament. In 
comparison, all 15 EU Member States (including Scotland's comparator countries Ireland, 
Denmark and Finland) had a 100% attendance record. For the SNP the 9% attendance 
record of Scottish Ministers flags up the underlying compromise of Scottish devolution. 
Scotland may enjoy certain devolved powers but it does not have a regular voice in Europe. 
Since the Scotland Act stipulates that Scottish ministers may attend EU meetings the SNP is 
determined that "under an SNP government, there will be a Scottish Ministerial or official 
representation at every Council of Ministers meeting".23 
The trouble with the SNP's determination to attend each and every EU forum is that it 
ignores the reality of the devolution settlement. Most of the devolved areas (agriculture, 
economic development, industry, transport, and the environment) also form part of the EU 
policy agenda - and so one might have expected more Scottish direct participation. But 
when negotiating at EU level (a non-devolved matter of foreign policy), it is the UK 
Government which represents the interests of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The 
United Kingdom representatives have to speak in unison at those meetings. There is no 
room for dissent from the devolved parliament before the EU. It is thus not for the SNP to 
determine that they will attend each EU formal meeting once they make up the Scottish 
Executive; it is for the United Kingdom government to invite Scottish Ministers to attend 
such meetings. 
2%ddre~~  by the leader of the SNP John Swinney to the Scottish European Association in Brussels, 
entitled "Independent Scotland in EU Partnership", 6 November 2000. 
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The Scottish Office recognised these difficulties early on and helped draft a Concordat on 
Co-ordination of European Union Policy Issues" which guarantees a consultative role for 
the devolved administrations. Whilst the EU remains the responsibility of the United 
Kingdom Government 
the UK Government wishes to involve the Scottish Executive as directly and 
fully as possible in decision making on EU matters which touch on devolved 
areas (including non-devolved matters which impact on devolved areas and 
non-devolved matters which will have a distinctive impact of importance in 
Scotland). In general, it is expected that consultation, the - exchange of 
information and the conventions on notifications to EU bodies will continue in 
similar circumstances to the arrangements in place prior to devolution. 
Participation will be subject to mutual respect for the confidentiality of 
discussions and adherence by the Scottish Executive to the resulting UK line 
without which it would be impossible to maintain such close working 
relationships. This line will reflect the interests of the UK as a whole. In 
accordance with these general principles, the co-ordination mechanisms should 
achieve three key objectives: 
they should provide for full and continuing involvement of Ministers and 
officials of the Scottish Executive in the process of policy formulation, 
negotiation and implementation, for issues which touch on devolved 
matters.; 
they should ensure that the UK can negotiate effectively, in pursuit of a 
single UK policy line, but with the flexibility that fast-moving negotiations 
require; and 
they should ensure EU obligations are implemented with consistency of 
effect and where appropriate of timing.'" 
The current position is that the influence of the Scottish Executive on EU policy making is 
only indirect via the UK Government. The Scottish Executive must respect confidentiality as 
well as the UK Government's position. 
It is therefore not surprising that the SNP sees material benefits for an independent 
Scotland at EU level. Scotland's view is currently merged into the UK's view. The Unionist 
position plays into the hands of the SNP who can exploit the weaknesses of the Scotland 
Act. The political compromise at national level fails, in practice, at supranational level.- 
The perceived benefits of having an independent Scotland negotiate at EU level, and 
'punching above its weight' as it is commonly said, are misleading. On the one hand, 
Scotland would be better represented numerically at EU level. Just looking at the weighted 
votes in the Council it appears that an independent Scotland might get seven votes, whilst 
24 In "Memorandum of Understanding and supplementary agreements", Cm 4444, October 1999. 
rUK would either keep its current 29 or face a reduction but to no fewer than 27 votes 
(equal with Spain). The joint force of those votes would be a remarkable 34-36 votes - 
provided that Scotland and rUK vote together. But the conclusion that Scottish interests are 
therefore better or more efficiently represented is wrong. As of now the Scottish voice is 
heard in Europe via UK representation. If Scotland needed to pursue a policy of its own, it 
would be more effective if it received the backing of the UK Government. The guarding of 
national interests by small states, on the other hand, is particularly difficult in the EU. 
Whilst small countries will continue to enjoy disproportionately large voting power 
(compared to the size of their population) in the Council, the Nice Summit did weaken their 
future position. The Summit also extended Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to a number of 
areas so that small states will find it increasingly hard to secure exceptional arrangements 
for themselves. 
The questions that will remain unanswered are to do with the political line taken by a 
future Scottish Government. In which policy areas would Scotland adopt the same or 
different policies to the UK? There are conceivable 'grey' areas, such as food standards, 
employment, and the adoption of the Euro currency, over which an independent Scotland 
and rUK could clash. But those are not the only conflict areas. According to Sloat (2000:104): 
1. Over 60% of the fishing industry is in Scotland; 
2. Scottish agriculture is based on sheep and, hill-farming on less-favoured land, while 
England has more prairie farms suited to beef and dairy; 
3. Scotland has more peripheral areas than England, creating a greater need for Structural 
Funds. 
The difference here appears to be in the emphasis placed on different policy sectors (hill 
farming vs. sheep farming) rather than different policy areas. That said, those differences 
may become substantial rather than subtle. Some have suggested that the BSE crisis should 
have been treated as an 'English' - as opposed to 'British' crisis - because Scotland and 
Northern Ireland had different regulatory practices (ibid.). So if Scotland wanted to choose a 
line of policy distinct from rUK, where would it find allies? Would Scotland gang up with 
other small countries (like Ireland, the Nordic Countries, or Benelux) to form a powerful 
voice that may be - in political terms - stronger than the sum of its parts? Or would it 
follow the lead of small countries and look to either Germany or France to safeguard its 
 interest^?'^ Scotland would not have a stronger voice in the EU if it found no allies and was 
constantly outvoted. If it ended up voting with its natural ally - the United Kingdom - the 
gains of independence in Europe would be apparent rather than real. 
25 Paragraphs B1.3 - B1.4. 
 ice Uncle Gerhard and the little 'uns", The Economist 3 February 2001, p.44. 
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IV Terms of admission 
If it were the case that an independent Scotland found itself outside the European Union 
and had to negotiate its re-admittance into the EU it is worth considering on what terms it 
might be re-admitted. Scotland would most likely lose its allocation of the budget rebate. In 
1984, the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher negotiated a special discount on budget 
contribution worth E2bn a year and the United Kingdom has defended the rebate ever 
since. In July 2000, the Foreign Secretary Robin Cook told business leaders in Edinburgh 
that he did "not for one moment believe-that other countries of the European Union would 
allow [an independent] Scotland to retain the budget rebate from which taxpayers in 
Scotland benefit".27 At the Berlin summit in March 1999 the Labour government refused to 
negotiate the rebate even though the planned changes in contributions would have given 
the United Kingdom a windfall. 
V. The European Structural Funds 
The SNP has claimed that Scotland does not receive the amount of EU funds from the UK 
Government which is its due.28 The question is whether Scotland currently receives an 
appropriate share of the Structural Funds allocated to the United Kingdom by the EU, or 
whether Scotland would be better off as an independent country. The European Committee 
of the Scottish Parliament considered the matter in 2000'~ and its findings are considered 
below. 
The Structural Funds are a cornerstone of EU support for those areas suffering from high 
unemployment figures and undergoing economic regeneration. The Structural Funds are 
made up of four separate parts: 
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF); 
the European Social Fund (ESF); 
the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF); 
the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG). 
27 http://ne~~.bb~.~0.~k/~/english/uk/scotland/newid845000/845039.~tm [visited 2 February 
20011. 
2R 
"EU aid for Scotland 'goes astray"', The Independent 02 June 1999. 
29 European Committee, 6th Report (2000), Report of the Inqtriy into European Structural Funds and their 
Implementation in Scotland, Scottish Parliament, Edinburgh. 
Scotland has been in receipt of EU funding ever since the Structural Funds were set up in 
1975. Until 1988, no specific funds were set aside for Scotland. The European Commission 
approved individual projects on a case-by-case basis, as and when they were submitted 
within the quotas of the ERDF allocated to each Member State. The Structural Funds were 
reformed in 1988 and eligible regions (such as the Highlands and Islands) received 
allocations for multi-annual development programmes covering the 1989-92, 1992-93 and 
1994-99 programme periods. 
The Structural Funds are generally implemented through regional development 
programmes. It is for the most part up to the Member States and regions to define their 
priorities for development. But since the programmes are part-financed by the EU, the 
Member States and regions also have to take Community priorities into account so as to 
further the stated objective of economic and social cohesion. 
Prospective EU enlargement has necessitated a re-evaluation of the Structural Funds. 
Continuous operation of the Funds would not be possible without reform as EU expansion 
invariably places increased demands on resources. For the period 2000-6 the previous six 
objectives have been streamlined and divided into three  objective^:^' 
Objective 1: Assistance will still be targeted at (i) areas with a GDP per capita of less than 
75% of the EU average, (ii) former Objective 6 areas, and (iii) certain remote regions. 
Coverage will be reduced from 25% to 20% of the EU population. There will be at least 
four Objective 1 areas in the UK: Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly, Merseyside, South 
Yorkshire, and West Wales and the Valleys. 
Since 1999 the GDP per capita in the Highlands and Islands has risen above 75% of the 
EU average. It was only due to the special characteristics of the region (in particular 
peripherality and low population density) that the Berlin summit in March 1999 agreed 
to a further cash injection of Euro 300 million (£194 million at 1999 prices) under the 
Special Transitional Objective 1 Programme. The programme is targeted at the 
Highlands and Islands from 2000 till 2005 and the Islands only in 2006. 
Objective 2: The new Objective 2 supports the economic and social conversion of areas 
facing structural difficulties, particularly socio-economic problems in areas of industrial 
decline, rural areas, urban areas and fishery-dependent areas. It brings together 
Objectives 2 and 5 (b) of the current programming period and extends them to cover 
""arious figures are found in the literature on Structural Funding. The divergences stem mainly 
from converting Euros (which is the default currency for Structural Funds) into pound sterling. The 
figures used here stem from the Scotland i n  Europe brochure by the European Commission and from 
the European Commission's Highlands and lslands Special Transitional Objective 1 Progranzme 2000-2006 
(June 2000). 
other areas. Three programmes are devoted to Western, Eastern and Southern Scotland 
with a total allocation of Euro 807 million (or £521 million). 
Objective 3: The new programme amalgamates the previous Objectives 3 and 4 and 
provides funding from the European Social Fund to support the adaptation and 
modernisation of policies and systems of education, training and employment. It will 
fund assistance outside the areas covered by Objective 1 and 2, which will receive ESF 
allocations as part of their programmes, and provide a framework for all measures to 
promote human resources in each Member State. The UK's total allocation is Euro 4,568 
million (£2,947 million), of which 10.5 %, or Euro 481 million (£310 million), has been 
allocated to Scotland. 
For the 2000-06 period, Scotland has been allocated Structural Funds of £1,094 million 
(10.8% of the total UK allocation). There has thus been a marked drop in Scotland's share 
from 24.9% of the UK total in 1975-88 to 10.8% in 2000-06. The question the European 
Committee of the Scottish Parliament sought to answer was whether the UK government 
has allocated Scotland sums under the Structural Funds of a similar value to those the EU 
would expect Scotland to re~eive.~' 
The European Committee of the Scottish Parliament concluded that the allocation process 
by the UK is "relatively transparent and objective", and that (as far as it can tell) Scotland 
receives "an appropriate share of the Structural Funds allocated to the UK by the EU".32 
There is also no evidence to suggest that over the 2000-6 period "Scotland is losing out in 
the allocation for Structural Funds in the Assigned Budget". The Committee acknowledged 
that the converse had been argued but stated that "in the absence of the relevant 
information, this cannot be ~onfirmed".~~ 
As can be seen from the above, the allocation of Structural Funds to any Member State 
depends on a number of factors: the indicators selected to measure relative disparities in 
income per head, unemployment, population etc among the regions of the EU; the relative 
disadvantage of regions relative to EU averages; and the political influence of Member 
States on the allocation of EU funds (the designation of eligible areas and the allocation of 
finance to those eligible areas). Scotland has historically benefited from the Structural Funds 
due to its disadvantage in relation to the rest of the EU. This is unaffected whether Scotland 
is part of the United Kingdom or an independent State. 
" Ibid. at paragraph 43. 
32 Ibid.  at paragraph 45. 
" " id .  at paragraph 52. 
But at least two factors have to be borne in mind. First, the EU is in the process of 
enlargement and the streamlining of the Objectives means that existing beneficiary states 
will lose much if not all of their funding. According to EU Commission figures, Scotland's 
annual receipts for Objectives 1, 2 and 3 will drop by 4% from Euro 244 million between 
1994-99 to around Euro 234 million between 2000-06. That may not seem like much of a 
reduction. But looking only at Objective 2, eligibility will drop from Euro 170 million a year 
in 1994-9 to around Euro 87 million a year in 2000-06 - roughly speaking a 50% drop that 
corresponds to population reduction. The eligible population for Objective 2 and 5(b) in 
1994-99 was 3,704.000, whereas now it is 2,029.000. The difference of 1,675.000 will receive 
transitional support of almost Euro 200 million. 
The second factor is that the United Kingdom has been able to negotiate special deals on 
behalf of Scotland, for instance the Special Transitional Objective 1 Programme for the 
Highlands and Islands at the Berlin Council in March 1999. It can be argued that Scotland, 
negotiating as an independent State without the weight of the UK, would not have been 
able to negotiate such an arrangement against all the odds. On the other hand, agreement 
on Structural Funds at the time of the Berlin Council required unanimity among the 
Member States and that might well have allowed Scotland to secure the special deal for 
itself anyway. Unanimity would have allowed Scotland to argue its own interests resulting 
in at least the same deal for the Highlands and Islands. 
In conclusion, Scottish independence will largely leave untouched the issue of the Structural 
Funds. EU enlargement changes the map of disadvantaged regions, boosting the position of 
Scotland relative to new EU averages and making it harder for Scotland to qualify for 
additional funds. 
Moreover, at the Nice summit in December 2000 it was decided that the Structural Funds 
will be subject to QMV as from 2007. QMV reduces the ability of states to secure special 
deals for themselves - which is why Spain, Greece and Portugal, who have always done 
well out of the Fund, were so unwilling to give up their veto rights. Arguably, Scotland 
would be better off as part of the UK regarding its negotiating position, especially if the UK 
makes the Highlands and Islands a priority. Alternatively, it is also quite possible that an 
independent Scotland could ally itself with the Nordic countries and negotiate 'en bloc' a 
favourable settlement for sparsely populated areas. 
Conclusion 
If Scotland were to apply to become a member timing would matter because the EU is in a 
process of enlargement and the terms that an independent Scotland could negotiate would 
differ if the EU had 28 rather than the current 15 Member States. The first intake of new 
members will likely take place from the end of 2002. But the possibility of transition periods 
should be noted. The accession treaties will include transitional measures on the free 
movement of persons to quell fears of cheap migrant labour from the Eastern bloc flooding 
the EU. Full membership of Poland, Hungary and Estonia, the applicant States with the best 
credentials, is not expected to be granted until 2005/2006. 
The process of negotiation is unlikely to be easy even for Scotland. Evidence from other 
candidate countries suggests that the EU uses its pre-accession bargaining strength to 
extract the maximum concessions from acceding parties. Member States are obviously 
aware that once candidates have joined, existing Member States will never have such an 
advantage again. Moreover, all new accession treaties have to be ratified by all national 
parliaments, a process which takes a minimum of twelve months and may take much 
longer if (as with the Treaty of Maastricht) major issues are at stake, or the treaty is rejected 
by a national parliament or in a referendum. 
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